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PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY AND THE FAIR TRIAL:
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN,
ENGLISH AND COMMONWEALTH LAWT
ZELMAN COWENf
More than two hundred years ago an English judge declared that
"nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice than to preserve
their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of
more pernicious consequence than to prejudice the minds of the public
against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is finally
heard."' It is apparent that the blaze of publicity which surrounds
causes celebres, and particularly criminal trials, does involve a very real
danger, to quote from the same opinion, of "prejudicing mankind against
persons, before the cause is heard."' 2 Of course, there are things that we
cannot know for certain; we do not know precisely what effects the pub-
lication in mass media of matter prejudicial to the trial of an accused
person may have; the use of the word "prejudicial" itself prejudges the
issue. But judges in many jurisdictions, in the United States and in
various British Commonwealth countries, which found their jurispru-
dence on the common law, have assumed that the publication of such mat-
ter does prejudice the fair trial of accused persors and have shaped
various legal doctrines and principles in light of this assumption.
In the United States, this matter has been widely discussed. The
discussion waxes and wanes; it becomes more urgent because of extra-
ordinary publicity surrounding a case or particular event. In the 1930's,
the Hauptnzann case,3 concerning the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby,
made many lawyers and the American Bar Association very anxious
about the effect and impact on the legal process of a torrent of publicity.
To quote from one contemporary report:
There never was a case that lent itself to greater temptation to
lurid or excessive publicity, never a case more provocative of
trial out of court, never a case beset with greater menace of
disorderly procedure. On the other hand, there never was a case
t Address delivered on January 21, 1965 at Indianapolis, Indiana as an Addison C.
Harris Memorial Lecture.
t Professor of Public Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Mel-
bourne.
1. Roach v. Garvan [1740] 2 ATK. 469 per Lord Hardwicke.
2. Id. at 472.
3. State v. Hauptmann, 115 NJ. 412, 180 At. 809 (1935).
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which offered such an opportunity for charting out a course for
the proper conduct of difficult criminal trials, for the greater
the difficulty, the greater the opportunity. In fact, there never
was a case in which publicity agencies and commentators and
public argufiers were more unrestrained, never a case which
furnishes a better example of things that ought not to have
been done. In all, it was a case which was well characterized by
the language penned by the Honorable Newton D. Baker in
the report of the so-called Baker Committee . . . as exhibiting
'perhaps the most spectacular and depressing example of im-
proper publicity and professional misconduct ever presented to
the people of the United States in a criminal trial.'4
A quarter century later, the events which occurred in the immediate
aftermath of the assassination of President Kennedy gave rise to great
concern on the part of lawyers. In December, 1963, the American Bar
Association issued a statement saying that what had taken place
struck at the heart of a fundamental rule of law with its guaran-
tees of a fair trial for everyone, however heinous the crime in-
volved. The widespread publicizing of Oswald's alleged guilt,
involving statements by officials and public disclosures of the
details of 'evidence' would have made it extremely difficult to
empanel an unprejudiced jury and afford the accused a fair
trial. It conceivably could have prevented any lawful trial of
Oswald due to the difficulty of finding jurors who had not
been prejudiced by these public statements.
The Warren Commission in its Report gave a detailed account of these
events' and recommended that
the representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and
the news media work together to establish ethical standards con-
cerning the collection and presentation of information to the
public so that there will be no interference with pending crimi-
nal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals
to a fair trial.'
To an English or a British Commonwealth lawyer, such a proposal,
couched in voluntary and hortatory terms, seems very strange. We think
in compulsive terms; even if we do not go all the way with the late H. L.
4. Hallam, Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REV. 453, 454 (1940).
5. REPORT OF THE WARREN COMISSION ON THE AsSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY, ch. V (Bantam Book ed. 1964).
6. REPORT OF THE WARREN COMMIssION, op. cit. supra note 5 at 47.
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Mencken in saying that "journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine,"
we say that it is for the law to shape rules to deal with these problems, and
the English-Commonwealth law deals with these problems by resort to
the law of criminal contempt of court. In the United States, consider-
able difficulty has been experienced in formulating a constitutionally
viable law of contempt to deal with these problems. In the United
States, too, there are very strong doubts about the propriety of compul-
sive restriction of freedom of the press, even in this area. As the author
of the most recent American text on contempt of court expresses it,
The latitude of American courts in dealing with the press is a
cause both of the gauche sensationalistic press-all too frequent
in this country-and for, on the other hand, so-me of the social
reforms, the great informational interchanges and the general
enlightenment of the population in matters of public interest.
For this latter reason primarily, the use of constructive con-
tempt against the press by American courts has been sporadic
and unsuccessful.'
There are important and contending values, and the wise resolution of
conflicts may not always be as clear as some of the English and Common-
wealth cases suggest. Moreover, as I shall attempt to show, there is some
incoherence in English doctrine, and the sensational English press does
in fact build up an atmosphere of prejudice. And recent events and
events surrounding trials leave one with the strong impression that the
English contempt rules do not always effectively protect an accused per-
son in a cause celebre from grave prejudice.'
I. THE ANIERICAN RULE
In Delaney v. United States' the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit said
How best to protect accused persons from the prejudicial effect
of newspaper publicity has been a matter of immense concern.
In England, such publicity is largely curbed by the free use of
the power of the courts to punish for contempt. . . . In this
country the course of treatment has been difficult. So far as
the federal courts are concerned there are important limitations
upon the power to punish summarily for contempt. See 18
U.S.C. § 401. . . . More fundamentally, it has been thought
7. GOLDFAIu, THE CONTEMPT POWER 89 (1963).
S. See, LuDovIc KENNEDY, THE TAL OF STEPHEN WARD (1964).
9. 199 F.2d 107 (1952).
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that this modern phenomenon of 'trial by newspaper' is pro-
tected to a considerable degree by the constitutional right of
freedom of the press. . . On this view there has been some
fatalistic acceptance of 'trial by newspaper,' however unfortu-
nate, 'as an unavoidable course of metropolitan living (like, I
suppose, crowded subways).' . . . The courts are then limited
to doing what they can to insulate jurors from the prejudicial
effect of such publicity, as by cautionary instructions or by the
granting of continuances, or in some cases granting a change of
venue. Perhaps the Supreme Court has not spoken its last word
upon this vexing problem."0
Whether or not the Supreme Court has spoken its last word, it has
certainly indicated in cases coming to it from state courts that the pros-
pects of fashioning controls of prejudicial publicity through the law of
contempt are dim and obscure. Over a twenty year period in Bridges v.
California," Pennekamp v. Florida,"2 Craig v. Harney" and Woods v.
Georgia,4 the Supreme Court reversed contempt convictions by state
courts. In all these cases, the convictions were held to be constitutionally
unsupportable. By way of the fourteenth amendment they were said to
be violations of first amendment freedoms. It was said that English
doctrine was not controlling, that a conviction for contempt for prejudi-
cial publication could only be sustained on a showing of "clear and present
danger," and that such a showing was very difficult to make.
In each of these cases, except Woods v. Georgia, the state courts in-
volved were composed of judges without juries. In Woods v. Georgia,
there was a grand jury and Warren C. J. expressly left open "the variant
factors that would be present in a case involving a petit jury." What
is to be spelled out of this reservation is very uncertain; in one of the
earlier cases the Court said that jurors are "men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate,"'" and in Woods v. Georgia, Harlan J., dissent-
ing, found it difficult to distinguish between the cases of prejudice to
grand and petit juries.
Throughout these cases, and the companion case of Maryland v. Bal-
10. Id. at 113.
11. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
12. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
13. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
14. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
15. Id. at 389.
16. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
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timnore Radio Show Inc., there was a persistent theme of caution or dis-
sent from the sweeping propositions of majorities as serting a very narrow
constitutional ambit for the application of contempt penalties. Frank-
furter J. persistently argued for a wider control tbrough contempt pro-
ceedings, pointing to English doctrines and authorities, and since his re-
tirement from the Court, the torch has been passed to Harlan J. who
sharply and trenchantly dissented in Woods v. Georgia. Frankfurter J.
stated his view very clearly in Irvin v. Dowd,8 where the court was not
directly concerned with the issue of contempt, but with an application to
reverse a conviction for murder on the ground that prejudicial publicity
surrounding the events and trial had denied to the accused a trial satisfy-
ing the requirements of due process.
Not a term passes without this Court being importuned to re-
view convictions had in States throughout the country in which
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted
because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as in
this case, with the prosecutor's collaboration-exerting pres-
sures upon potential jurors before trial and even during the
course of the trial, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible,
to secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evi-
dence submitted in open court. Indeed such extraneous influ-
ences, in violation of the decencies guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion, are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced to
forego trial by jury. . . . For one reason or another this Court
does not undertake to review all such envenomed state prosecu-
tions. But, again and again, such disregard of fundamental
fairness is so flagrant that the Court is compelled, as it was
only a week ago, to reverse a conviction in which prejudicial
newspaper intrusion has poisoned the outcome .. . This Court
has not yet decided that the fair administratior of criminal jus-
tice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our consti-
tutional system-freedom of the press, properly conceived. The
Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be re-
versed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of
jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is consti-
tutionally protected in plying his trade. 9
17. 338 U.S. 912 (1950). Certiorari denied when state court of appeals reversed
lower court conviction for contempt where there had been an unrelenting barrage of
prejudicial publicity directed against a man arrested, tried and convicted of murder.
18. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
19. Id. at 729.
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Such discourse evokes a warm response in the breast and mind of
an English or Commonwealth lawyer. But even though the Supreme
Court has not altogether, and in terms, shut the door on the possibility of
using the contempt weapon to punish prejudicial publication, and even
though other federal and state courts have at least expressed the hope
that in petty jury cases the door may still be open,2" the opinion is widely
held that the contempt power is a frail reed in the United States to control
prejudicial publicity. It has been said that the cases show the contempt
power to be a ". . . negligible device for protecting a defendant's right
to a fair trial."'" Another commentator describes himself as "relatively
pessimistic about our ability to improve materially the existing legal ma-
chinery for the protection of criminal defendants against virtually un-
fettered publicity."22  Certainly television, the press and the media gen-
erally, in their dealing with Oswald after his arrest for the murder of
President Kennedy, acted in apparent confidence that they were subject
to no legal restraints. Speaking as an English and Commonwealth law-
yer, and as a witness to the conduct of the media during those terrible
days, I found the performance incredible. In this particular respect we
are a long way apart.
There is, however, a substantial body of Supreme Court authority,
reversing, on due process grounds, convictions of accused persons which
have been obtained in a pre-trial and trial process perverted by prejudicial
publicity. Irvin v. Dowd28 was such a case. There, for months before
the trial began, a barrage of newspaper publicity was directed against the
accused; radio and television recited his personal history, his record of
juvenile crimes and other convictions, and he was described as a "con-
fessed slayer," a parole violator and a fraudulent check artist. More re-
cently in Rideau v. Louisiana,24 the Supreme Court reversed a murder
conviction, after a local television station had thrice shown a film of an
interrogation of Rideau in which the prisoner had confessed his guilt. It
was said that due process in this case required a trial by a jury drawn
from a community of people who had not seen or heard Rideau's televised
interrogation.
Some judges, notably Black J., of the Supreme Court, have regularly
20. See, e.g., Delaney v. U.S., 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Atlanta Newspaper v.
State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.
1959) ; People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 473, 180 N.E.2d 419 (1962).
21. Donnelly and Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 24
MODERN L. RE V. 239, 245 (1961).
22. Mueller, Problens Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 24 (1961).
23. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). See also, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
24. 31 U.S.L. WVEEK 4547 (U.S. June 3, 1963).
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joined with majorities in reversing contempt convictions for prejudicial
publication, while they have vigorously asserted that convictions of ac-
cused persons should be reversed on due process grounds where the trials
were perverted by prejudicial publicity. In Beck v. Washington,2 the
Supreme Court refused to reverse the conviction of Beck who complained
of prejudice. Black J. dissented, declaring that a "fair trial under fair
procedures is a basic element in our government. Zealous partisans filled
with bias and prejudice have no place among those whom government
selects to play important parts in trials designed to lead to fair deter-
mination of guilt or innocence."26  But reversals of convictions do not
operate as a control or sanction upon the activities of the media. Such
reversals are "all in the nature of after thoughts or after-effects,"2 and
may well produce the result that guilty men will go free because the
courts deny to themselves power to control publicity which tends to
prejudice the conduct of trials, the verdict in which they will subse-
quently nullify because, and only because, of that prejudicial publicity.
As Judge Will put it, "[i]t can be either the public or the accused who
suffers as the result of the publicity, to say nothing of the ill-effects on
the fair and efficient administration of justice."2
II. THE ENGLISH AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RULE
The English rule, which is also the general British Commonwealth
rule with respect to the publication of matter which may prejudice the
fair conduct of a trial, is very different. Any act which tends to inter-
fere with the due course of justice constitutes a contempt of court, and
is summarily punishable as such. The reason for the rule was expounded
sixty years ago in an English case:
The reason why the publication of articles like those with which
we have to deal is treated as a contempt of court is because their
tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of
the power of doing that which is the end for which it exists-
namely to administer justice duly, impartially and with refer-
ence solely to the facts judicially brought before it. Their
tendency is to reduce the court which has to try the case to
impotence, so far as the effectual elimination of prejudice is
concerned."3
25. 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
26. Id. at 569.
27. Will, Fair Press Versus Fair Trial, 12 DEPAuL L. REg. 197, 209 (1963).
28. Id. at 205.
29. R. v. Parke [1903] 2 KB. 432, 436.
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This does not mean that the values in a free press are ignored or
disregarded; the question is seen as one of balance. As a Canadian judge
has well said:
In many cases the press renders great public service by the pub-
lication of reports or events surrounding the commission of a
crime or an alleged crime and it is no function of the courts to
act as censors of the press, but it is the function of the courts
scrupulously to preserve the right of an individual to have a fair
trial and to see that there shall not be any trespass on this right
by the publication of reports that are calculated to interfere
with it. 0
The English exercise of this contempt power has been described by
an American writer as "frightening to one who is reared in the climate of
a free-wheeling press""1 and as a "Draconian control over press coverage
of trials to keep the 'stream of justice' pure." 2 There has certainly been
no hesitation on the part of the courts to use the contempt power in cases
which they regard as being clear and to impose severe punishments. One
of the most celebrated of comparatively recent cases was R. v. Bolam.8"
An English newspaper published statements referring to a man who had
been arrested for murder. It was said that he was a human vampire, and
supporting descriptions were furnished. It was also said that he had
committed other murders, and the names of the alleged victims were sup-
plied. Upon conviction the newspaper company was heavily fined and
the editor was sent to prison. Lord Chief Justice Goddard said:
In the long history of the present class of cases there has never,
in the opinion of the court, been one of such gravity as this, or
one of such a scandalous and wicked character. It was of the
utmost importance that the court should vindicate the common
principles of justice, and, in the public interest, see that condign
punishment was meted out to persons guilty of such conduct.8"
There is abundant authority in English and Commonwealth case law
which shows that the media will find themselves in contempt if they
comment on existing proceedings, and the ambit of "comment" is very
30. R. v. Steiner, 114 C.C.C. 117, 120 (Ont. S.C. 1955). See also, R. v. Blumen-
feld, 29 T.L.R. 308, 311 (1912) ; R. v. Arrowsmith, Vicr. L.R. 486, 494 (1946).
31. GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 7, at 88.
32. Goldfarb, En.imring Fair Trials: The Impropriety of Publicity, The New Re-
public, February 29, 1964, p. 12.
33. 93 SoL. J. 220 (1949). Cf. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show Inc., 338 U.S.
912 (1950). See note 16 supra.
34. 93 SOL. 3. 220 (1949).
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wide."5  And the definition of "proceedings" is also very broad. It is
settled law that the power to punish for contempt can and will attach at
a point of time at which a person has been arrested even though charges
have not yet been laid and a trial has not yet begun. 6 As Wills J. said,
sixty years ago, in R. v. Parke," "it is possible very effectually to poison
the fountain of justice before it begins to flow.""3 In a recent Scottish
case, a newspaper company was heavily fined for contempt for publish-
ing an article at a time when a man was merely detained by police in Eng-
land in connection with inquiries into two murders which had been com-
mitted in Scotland. He was not charged until a date subsequent to the
publication. The court said that the prisoner was under police arrest and
declined to fix the time of committal as the first point at which the power
to punish for contempt arose. "The test must necessarily in both cases
be the same-will the steps that have been taken by the newspaper be such
as to prejudice the impartiality of the ultimate trial if a trial takes
place?"" ° The only unresolved question in the Commonwealth case law
is how far back it is possible to go; specifically, is it possible to go back
beyond arrest to a point where arrest may be imminent and the police are
in hot pursuit? It is apparent that the prejudice to the person subse-
quently brought to trial may be just as great. The Commonwealth cases
are not consistent on this point; some assert a power, while the Austra-
lian High Court denies it on the ground that there must be proceedings
already initiated by an arrest to attract power to punish for contempt.4"
Apart from these special problems, Commonwealth courts have pun-
ished as contempt statements by the media which are or may be damaging
to a person charged with crime, review his prior record or express
opinions as to his guilt or innocence. It has been held to be a contempt
to publish a photograph of an accused man where it is reasonably clear
that a question of identity may arise and where the publication is calcu-
lated to prejudice a fair trial. 1 Of particular note in the United States
context, is the English rule that it is contempt for a newspaper to conduct
35. See, Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court i;: English Law, 48 HARv.
L. PEv. 885 (1935).
36. See, R. v. Parke [1903] 2 K.B. 432; R. v. Clark; E:: parte Crippen 103 L.T.
636 (1910) ; Packer v. Peacock, 13 Commonwealth L.R. 577 (1912) ; James v. Robinson
[1964] Argus L.R. 7.
37. [1903] 2 K.B. 432, 438.
38. Id. at 438.
39. Stirling v. Associated Newspapers [1960] Scots L.T. 7.
40. Reg v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd. [1960] Northern Ireland 15 (yes) ; R. v.
Daily Mirror, Ex parte Smith [1927] 1 K.B. 851 (England, open) ; James v. Robinson
[1964] Argus L.R. 7 (Australia, no). See, Note, Contempt of Court When Proceedings
Imnzient, 80 LAw Q.R. 166 (1964).
41. R. v. Daily Mirror, Ex parte Smith [1927] 1 K.B. 845.
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an independent investigation into a crime for which a man has been ar-
rested and to publish the results of that investigation."2 Indeed, recent
English cases have formulated such a far reaching and drastic power to
punish for contempt for the prejudicial publication of these investiga-
tions that the legislature has intervened to furnish statutory defenses in
appropriate cases. 3
It is not surprising then that an American commentator would de-
scribe this English contempt doctrine as "a Draconian control" 4 over the
press. Mr. Justice Douglas has pointed to the differences in English and
American doctrine and has observed that, "We have made our choice,
refusing to sacrifice freedom of the press to the whims of judges. We
know that judges as well as editors can be tyrants."45  And the English
judges have announced quite plainly what they are doing. As Darling J.
put it in the Crippen case,4" "We say that we are determined while we are
here to do nothing to substitute in this country trial by newspaper for
trial by jury, and those who attempt to introduce that system into his
country, even in its first beginnings, must be prepared to suffer for it."47
Notwithstanding the severity with which English and Common-
wealth courts visit by summary punishment for contempt the publication
of matter which may prejudice the conduct of fair trials, the cases con-
tinue to arise. There is a substantial and increasing corpus of authority
in the books. If a newspaper of wide circulation publishes highly prejudi-
cial matter and is severely punished for contempt before the trial of the
person prejudiced, a question arises as to the standing on appeal of a con-
viction in the subsequent criminal proceedings which may have been
tainted by the publication. The prejudicial matter may consist of details
of an accused person's prior convictions or may contain other charges of
crime which would plainly be inadmissible on his trial on a plea of not
guilty. If such matter was wrongly admitted in evidence, there can be
little doubt that this would be held reversible error. But does it follow,
if it can be shown that the publication had a wide and pervasive distribu-
tion, that a conviction would be reversed on the ground that there was a
miscarriage of justice? There is no English or Australian case that I
have been able to discover which suggests that the conviction would be
42. R. v. Evening Standard (Editor), 40 T.L.R. 833 (1924).
43. See, Reg v. Odhams Press, [1957] 1 Q.B. 73; Reg v. Griffiths [1957] 2 Q.B.
192; Adnistration of Justice Act 1960, section 11 (U.K.), this section provides for a
defense of innocent publication and distribution simniliar to the defense of innocent dis-
semination in the case of libel.
44. GOLDFAB, op. cit. supra note 32.
45. Douglas, The Public Trial and The Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 841 (1960).
46. R. v. Clarke, Ex parte Crippen, 103 L.T. 636 (1910).
47. Id. at 636.
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reversed. After reviewing English decisions on contempt by publication,
the most recent American text writer on contempt writes:
The greatest failure of English contempt law is its disrelation
with its most valuable object-protection of fair trials. It is of
little service to an accused person who is written into jail by a
prejudiced press that the publisher or editor is fined or im-
prisoned. His victory is a hollow one unless the conviction is
reversed. The contempt vehicle is only indirectly curative of
unfair trials, if at all, though this is its most valuable purpose.4"
If this is so, we have a further interesting contrast between English and
American law in this field. The American authorities expose the diffi-
culty of sustaining contempt convictions for the publication of matter
prejudicial to the conduct of a fair trial, but they also point to the very
real possibility of reversing a conviction tainted by such prejudicial pub-
licity. The English cases show that the courts are ever ready to punish
such publication as contempt, but there is no suggestion that the publica-
tion of such matter would provide ground for the reversal of a conviction.
There is another unsatisfactory aspect of the English law on this
matter. Alongside the rule that publication of matter which is calculated
to prejudice the conduct of a fair trial is punishable as contempt, there
has to be set the rule current in English and some Commonwealth juris-
dictions that publication of the details of committal or like preliminary
proceedings in criminal cases is not subject to restriction. Such proceed-
ings are, in effect, preliminary enquiries by magistrates into more serious
charges of crime to determine whether the accused should be discharged
there and then, or whether he should be sent for trial by the appropriate
court. In England, until the 1880's, it was not clear whether newspapers
could freely and lawfully publish the details of such proceedings, but the
Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888 has been construed as giving au-
thority for such publication. The consequences of this have been noted
by a distinguished Scottish lawyer:
As regards publication of the prosecution's evidence before trial,
English law is as lax as its rules regarding comment are strict.
After arrest an accused may be remanded in custody by a mag-
istrate and later committed for trial by a panel of justices if
they find that the prosecution has made out a prima facie case.
Widespread publicity is often given to the evidence against
the accused at the pre-trial hearing, including evidence of al-
4 . GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 7, at 88.
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leged confessions and other evidence which may actually be ex-
cluded at the trial itself. As a rule, only the evidence for the
prosecution is heard at the proceedings for committal, and, al-
though the magistrates have a discretion to exclude publicity,
they have rarely done so.49
The discretion to exclude publicity may be exercised by holding proceed-
ings in camera." In committal proceedings, the defense will often, though
not invariably, reserve its case. There have been occasions where the
publication of the details of committal proceedings have given rise to the
greatest anxiety about the dangers of prejudice to the accused at his sub-
sequent trial. A recent and frequently cited English case is that of
Dr. John Bodkin Adams,5' who was charged with murder. In the course
of the committal proceedings, prosecution evidence was given that other
patients of the doctor had died in mysterious circumstances under his care,
and this evidence was not and could not have been given at his trial. In
the event, Adams was acquitted, but the blaze of publicity given to the
details of the prosecution evidence at the committal proceedings made the
burden of the defense counsel and of the trial judge truly formidable,
though they discharged it superbly well. At the trial, the judge, Devlin J.,
urged magistrates to use their power to hear such cases in camera.
The Adams case is only one among many. Another celebrated recent
English case was the trial of Stephen Ward. That trial was one of the
chapters in the unhappy and spectacular Profumo-Keeler story. Ward
was convicted and committed suicide. Ludovic Kennedy in his account
of the trial writes
. . . there were other reasons too, many over-lapping and all
accumulative, which led the jury to their verdict. The first was
something that happened long before they had been either called
or chosen. This was the very wide publicity given to the pro-
ceedings at the lower court at the end of June and beginning of
July. It is impossible to overestimate the harm that this pub-
licity must have done to Ward's defence. The prosecution's
case was prima facie more damaging to him than it was at the
Old Bailey; for it contained not only Ronna Ricardo's lying evi-
dence, which must have seemed to those who read it (and who
didn't) as general confirmation of what Mandy and Christine
49. T. B. SMTiE, STUDIES CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE 288 (1962).
50. A cause is said to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the
judge in his private room or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom.
BLACki, LAw DicTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
51. See, 1957 CRIM. L.R. (Eng.) 365.
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had alleged, but also two charges concerning the arranging of
abortions and one of keeping a brothel. The last charge was
subsequently dropped for lack of evidence, and the two abortion
charges were placed on a separate indictment. The evidence
for all three charges was flimsy in the extreme, and it is impos-
sible to resist the conclusion that the only reason they were
brought was the belief that the more mud that was thrown, the
more chance that some of it would stick. The dice were loaded
in the prosecution's favour even further by the fact, unknown
to the general public, that the defense at the lower court de-
liberately says little for fear of disclosing its hand. All this
combined to make the ordinary reader (including the subse-
quent Old Bailey Jury) believe that Ward was guilty of a mul-
titude of sexual misdemeanours long before he was tried. It
was all very well Mr. Justice Marshall telling the jury to put
out of their minds everything they had heard so far; but this
was virtually an impossibility.2
These were both causes celebres, but this happens far too frequently.
In the Adams and Ward cases, had the newspapers made similar comment
without purporting to report committal court proceedings they would
certainly have invited heavy punishment for contempt.
The English law which permits the publication of the details of com-
mittal proceedings does not apply in all Commonwealth jurisdictions. It
is not the law in Scotland where there is no public pre-trial hearing," and
there are controls over publication in Canadae4 and Northern Ireland."
In England, in the wake of the Adams case, a committee under the chair-
manship of Lord Tucker, a judge, was appointed to consider the matter.
The committee unanimously recommended that committal proceedings
should be held in public, but proposed that unless the prisoner was dis-
charged at that stage, "the proceedings should not Le reported beyond a
statement of the name of the prisoner and short details of the charge."
The reports at that stage "should not contain anything that may be
thought likely to prejudice the trial, provided that tlere should be no re-
striction on the publication of the charge and similar factual particu-
lars." The committee was of the opinion that it wes undesirable to con-
duct committal proceedings in camera and preferred to resolve the prob-
52. K=Nmy, op. cit. supra note 8, at 233.
53. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 49, at 289.
54. CRIMIN. CoDE, section 455 (2).
55. See, Edwards, Summary Jurisdiction Act (Northern Ireland), 1953, 16 MoDERN
L. REv. 485 (1953).
56. Command Paper (CMD) at 16 (1958).
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lem by preventing prejudice through the restriction of publication. These
proposals were greeted by a vehement press protest, and the English Press
Council issued a statement." To this date the recommendations of the
Tucker Committee have regrettably not been implemented. English and
Commonwelath law of criminal contempt can only be made sensible by
prohibiting the detailed reporting of committal proceedings until such
time as the trial is concluded.
III. COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH RULE
Some American judges and writers have looked admiringly at the
English law in its dealing with these problems. Certainly, what was done
by the media in the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy's death
in respect of Lee Harvey Oswald, his background and history, would not
have been done in England. The English media know rather well what
they cannot do-even though cases continue to arise-and they know
that the law of criminal contempt has a wide embrace. To that extent the
English law is in a posture superior to its American counterpart. It does
not appear that these controls over the English (and Commonwealth)
press are bought at too high a price in terms of restriction of valued
liberties. It is difficult to understand the "right to know" arguments
directed at proposed restrictions of the press.
The unsatisfactory aspects of the English law are its inconsistencies.
The English press is given a free hand in reporting committal proceed-
ings. When this is set alongside the restrictions which the law does im-
pose on prejudicial publication, one must conclude that the law has de-
veloped in water tight compartments, and that the right hand does not
know what the left is doing. It should also be said that a great body of
press opinion in England was and is opposed to the adoption of the
Tucker Committee's recommendations for the restriction of publication
of committal proceedings, and those recommendations have not been en-
acted into law. Although the press and other media live with their pres-
ent restrictions, they do not want any more of them.
Even within the existing rules, it is possible to build up a general
prejudicial atmosphere against persons on trial; the elaborate reporting
of the Profumo-Keeler-Ward scandal made it very difficult-even apart
from the Ward committal proceedings-to secure an unprejudiced trial
for Ward. As Goldfarb comments, one wonders about the caliber of the
English tabloids." While the English law does control prejudicial re-
porting by the media to a far greater extent than does the American law,
57. See, Gower, The Aftermath of the Adams Case, 20 MODERN L. REv. 387 (1957).
58. GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 8.
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it remains unsatisfactory in some respects. The English law is un-
satisfactory because it apparently loses interest in the prejudicial effect
of what is published by the media once the offending publisher has been
punished for contempt. But, like John Brown's body, the prejudice goes
marching on, and unlike the American law, the English law gives us no
ground to believe that this may lead to the reversal o- convictions. If an
English trial judge wrongly admitted evidence of the prior convictions
of an accused person, this would almost certainly be reversible error. But
if the convictions came to public attention (and to the attention of the
jury) by way of press or like publication (punishable and punished as
contempt), there is no indication in the cases that this would constitute
reversible error, notwithstanding that the theory which calls for the pun-
ishment of the offending medium for contempt is that the publication has
prejudiced the fair trial. To the extent that the defect in the English law
which arises from the publication of the details of committal proceedings
does not occur in the law of some Commonwealth jurisdictions, their law
is more coherent than the law of England.
But the American law in this area is very unsatisfactory indeed. It
seems quite extraordinary that the law says that the Constitution will not,
except perhaps in the most extreme cases, permit restraints on the press
or other media in respect of the publication of matter which prejudices the
conduct of a fair trial, and that the law also says that the publication of
that matter denies due process to convicted persons, and for that reason
requires the reversal of convictions. That is just what I understand
Mr. Justice Black to say is the law, and what I understand Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in dissent to say cannot or should not be the law. Certainly
the American press and media act as if it were the law. That the law can
find itself in a position in which the American Bar Association can con-
clude that the activities of the media "conceivably could have prevented
any lawful trial of Oswald due to the difficulty of finding jurors who
had not been prejudiced by these public statements" seems to me quite
intolerable, particularly when the Association-or for that matter the
Warren Commission-does not propose legally coercive proposals to deal
with this problem. It is not enough to say that the killing of a President
was an altogether special case which would break the bounds of any nor-
mal control; there are numerous illustrations of like behaviour on the part
of the media at national, regional and local levels in other cases.
The proposed palliatives which include continuances, changes of
venue, jury challenges and directions, are often very ineffective, and in
the "big" cases are simply hopeless as solutions to the problem. The more
pervasive the publicity, the less effective any or all of these proposed
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remedies will be. That the law should confess its failure and incapacity
to come to grips with this very real problem-and the volume of writing
and discussion makes it abundantly clear that it is felt to be a serious
problem-and that it should be proposed that the solution should be found
in self-restraint and voluntary agreement on the part of the media, seems
to me quite wrong. If there is a problem-and this does not seem to be
disputed-it is for the law to deal with it; it is not a case for exhortation
to good behaviour. In a regime of voluntarism, the good will strive to
comply, and the bad and the indifferent and the cynical will not.
The American law should face up to the need to frame properly
articulated legal controls over the act of publication of matter prejudicial
to the conduct of a fair trial. As contempt doctrines have been enunciated
in England and in Commonwealth jurisdictions, there is some reason to
be apprehensive, because of the summary character of the trial procedure
on a contempt charge and because of the want of defined limits of pun-
ishment. The Supreme Court of the United States now finds itself in
some uncertainty as to the constitutional limits of summary trial for con-
tempt, and the Barnett case"g suggests that those limits are quite narrow.
I agree with an English writer who, more than sixty years ago, expressed
concern at a jurisdiction to commit for criminal contempt ". . . which
enables a judge to commit to prison a subject of the Queen, without the
verdict of a jury and without appeal; to fine him either as an additional
or substitutional punishment, without limit of amount, for an offence
which has never been defined by statutory enactment. . . . "" This, he
concluded, "is a jurisdiction which no one will deny requires the closest
scrutiny whenever it is exercised."'" Appeals against convictions for
criminal contempt were not allowed in England until 1960.2 As for the
summary character of the jurisdiction, that is trial without jury, it has
a long and unsatisfactory history63 and has been justified in England on
the ground that a jury trial would be "too dilatory and too inconvenient
to afford any satisfactory remedy."6 This seems to me quite wrong and
whatever the history to be quite unsound in principle. If the spectre of
summary trial is removed, it seems to me that a major objection to the
exercise of the contempt power to control prejudicial publication will be
removed.
I do not think that a reading of the American cases leads to the con-
59. U.S. v. Barnett, 32 U.S.L. Week 4303 (U.S. April 6, 1964).
60. Hughes, Contempt of Court and the Press, 16 LAw Q.R. 292, 293 (1900).
61. Ibid.
62. Administration of Justice Act 1960, section 13.
63. See, GOLDFARB, op. Cit. supra note 7.
64. R. v. Davies [1906] 1 K.B. 32, 41.
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY 85
clusion that the Constitution forecloses any use of contempt or like powers
to control prejudicial publication by the media. The media certainly act as
though no control exists or is likely to be devised, and no doubt they draw
comfort from long practice, the absolutist position of some judges, the
present apparent stance of the law, and the seeming hopelessness of many
of the commentators. At a time when recent tragic events have rekindled
more urgent concern with this problem, we should hearken and respond to
the voices and arguments of those who have urged that it is possible and
desirable to use the law as an instrument to deal more effectively with
this matter.
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